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IAC-M-34

5 July 1951

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 5 July 1951

Director of Central Intelligence
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

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1220Z

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence,
Department of State
Major General A. R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, acting for Director of Intelligence,
Atomic Energy Commission
Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, USMC, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, acting for Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] SA (Ret.), Central Intelligence
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Boris H. Klosson, Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, Department of the Army
Colonel O. B. Sykes, Department of the Army
Colonel M. B. de Pass, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force
Colonel Samuel M. Lansing, The Joint Staff

James Q. Reber
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the meeting of 14 June 1951 (IAC-M-33) were approved.

Distribution of the Watch
Committee Reports

Possible Communist Objectives
in Suggesting a Cease Fire in
Korea (SE-8)

3. Action: It was decided to refer the draft to the Deputies for further discussion with the understanding that they were authorized to approve the paper for the IAC.

4. Discussion: The opinion was expressed that if in spite of Chinese Communists, UN Forces should approach the Manchurian border, the USSR would consider the situation very grave and would feel that they had no alternative but to intervene directly. It was the consensus that the Soviets do not now want to do this. The Communists, therefore, would like to disengage on terms not disadvantageous to them. It was felt that although their present predicament does not oblige them to disengage on any terms, it is possible that they may foresee themselves in a more critical situation in the future.

Proposed "National Intelligence
Study" on Soviet Military
Assistance to the Chinese
Communists (IAC-D-24)

5. Action: The paper was approved and G-2 agreed to take primary responsibility for the work.

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Effects of Operations in
Korea on Communist China
(NIE-32)

6. Action: The estimate was revised slightly and was approved with the addition of a footnote pointing out that the Air Force wished to emphasize the limited scope of the paper.

7. Mr. Reber was directed to take action with regard to the "Intelligence Gaps as Revealed in NIE-32" (IAC-D-25) and to see that each problem is broken down into its essential elements of information.

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